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I1.

V.

In 1965, when the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding a case of conscientious objection to military service, it found that certain statutory definitions
of religion were inadequate.' So the Court looked for help from outside, and
quoted some passages from certain eminent theologians of that day: erstwhile
Lutheran Paul Tillich,2 controversial Anglican Bishop John A.T. Robinson,3
Dr. David Saville Muzzey of the Ethical Culture Movement,4 as well as
from a draft report from the Vatican II Ecumenical Council.5
Why these? Did not choosing a group of theologians establish their view
of religion as the law of the land? But who should the Court have consulted,
if not these? In a secularized culture, the power to define what. is religion and
what is arrant nonsense has taken the place of the question of what is orthodox and what is heresy, in terms of its seriousness. Those who define religion for legal purposes thereby govern what religious activities will be permitted to us. Therefore, it is no surprise when questions are raised about the
present state of this issue.
In this article, I discuss the main issues involved in defining religion,

* Member, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and Professor, University of Florida. Ph.D.,
1970, University of Iowa; M.A., 1963. B.A., 1960, University of Kansas. The author would like to thank
Professors H. Jefferson Powell and Kermit L. Hall as well as Mr. Stephen R. Prescott for help and suggestions on this article.
1. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1965).
2. Id. at 180.
3. Id. at 181.
4. Id. at 182-83.
5. Id. at 181-82.
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show how some key Supreme Court decisions have created unnecessary
difficulties in this area, and suggest how a few changes in the Court's traditional language would be necessary to create a more reasonable, less controversial situation. Finally, I examine some practical implications of these
considerations for recent cases.
I. SOURCES OF LEGAL DEFNITIONS
The Supreme Court's actions in defining religion run the risk of establishing the Justices' own views of religion, and will inevitably interfere with
the "free exercise" of those who use another definition. It is clear that in the
United States the Supreme Court has the power to define religion. So the
source of its definition will be a critical factor in public acceptance of its
decisions. The public should feel that the definition is natural and "self-evident," rather than an arbitrary imposition.
That being the case, where can the Court turn for definitions that would
have more authority than others? There are at least seven possibilities. Of
course, there are dictionary definitions of religion, which are important because they try to reflect common usage. It seems appropriate to govern a
people in line with their own understandings of things, especially in a democracy. Choosing "expert" opinions which would violate that common
usage may well be resented. On the other hand, it may be precisely those
who have eccentric views of religion who will need the law's protection. A
second source are the definitions used by those who wrote the First Amendment-say Madison or Jefferson or their contemporaries.
In addition to these, there are various academic definitions as well. Theological definitions are the creations of experts operating within particular
confessional groups. Courts want to be sure that these are general or "generic" definitions that do not favor a particular religious tradition. Justices or
judges also might recognize that some theologians only try to reflect the
understanding of the group they represent, while others are attempting to
change their churches by leading them in an unfamiliar direction. There are
other academics-anthropologists, sociologists, historians, philosophers,
psychologists-who have a sub-specialty in studying religious behavior. They
may be sympathetic to religion, but they operate outside any particular
church in their academic capacity and try to be impartial and objective. To
that end, they claim to be shaping their definitions to the common understanding of the term, describing religion "phenomenologically"-as it is
approached or apprehended by common people who might not be able to
articulate their own religious compulsions. These fields are not seeking to
impose a definition, in the manner of the more aggressive theologians, but to
derive a definition from common behavior and assumptions.
We may postulate further possibilities. One might let "the people," or
their representatives, decide on a political definition of religion by an exer-
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cise of power, voting down those whom they think are superstitious. But this
is one thing that the establishment prohibition was meant to prevent. We
also might remember the influence of the media in all areas of our life. We
are not accustomed to thinking of the news as an independent entity with an
agenda of its own; it presents itself simply as a window on the world, and
therefore neutral. But the definitions favored by editors will be powerfully
influential when they are pounded into our heads day after day for generations. Finally, we might assume that only the individual can define religion
in a manner wholly satisfactory to that individual.
In Seeger, the Court chose a definition used by radical theologians, that
is those attempting to change their church by leading them in an unfamiliar
direction." The reason the Court saw the need for rethinking the matter was
that earlier decisions had already moved away from definitions which stipulated a belief in God or a Supreme Being. Such a definition would have been
"normative"-implying that those religious beliefs were acceptable and others were not. Not wishing to be too narrow in its treatment of religion-as
the country itself became more diverse-the Court shied away from specifying the content expected of religious belief. Still, there had to be some way
to decide which beliefs are "religious," and the Court found help in Paul
Tillich's notion of religious belief as one's "ultimate concern."' This seemed
to be the sort of generic and functional definition that would test whether a
particular party's ideas could be protected as religious even if they were
"atheistic" if judged by the old standard of belief in a Supreme Being.
Many feel that the law has gotten into a muddle because of this effort to
broaden the sense of what religion may include. The Court should be given
credit for trying to preserve our heritage of rights in an evolving or disintegrating culture, but it has discovered that religion is not an easy thing to
define because of cultural variety and change over time.
In a recent book, The Secularization of Early Modem England: From
Religious Culture to Religious Faith,9 I tried to show how certain sociologi-

cal and anthropological concepts help make sense of a very great historical
change in religion in England. The study focused, therefore, on the country
that was the source of our laws and our political institutions in the period
just before our Constitution was written.' ° The "secularization" of the title
does not refer to a decline of religious belief so much as the separation of
various areas of life and thought from religious direction. Essentially, the
secularization process reduces religious practice to religious belief and en6. By superstition, I mean the odd beliefs of people you do not respect.
7. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180-83.
8. Id at 187.
9. C. JOHN SoMmERvniE, THE SECuLARIZATION OF EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: FROM RELIGIous
CULTURE TO RELIGIous FArrH (1992).
10. See generally id.
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courages the emergence of a more conscious faith. It may be surprising to
think that religion had not always been a matter of belief or faith in this selfconscious sense. But for many people, then and now, religion is an implicit
trust in certain practices.Only after all the various aspects of life are separated from religious considerations do people begin to think of religions as
"meaning systems"-a definition one encounters more and more.
Jefferson had already reached that understanding when he penned
Virginia's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom."" The change to religion-as-belief had already taken place for the upper classes or intellectual
elites of British and American society by his day. Madison, however, at least
hinted at a broader definition when he spoke of religion as "the duty which
we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging it." 2 That implies
action as well as belief. Samuel Johnson's famous dictionary straddled the
fence, defining religion as "(1) Virtue, as founded upon reverence of God,
and expectation of future rewards and punishments. (2) A system of divine
faith and worship."' 3 Thus the time during which the framers of our First
Amendment lived was characterized by a balance between religious action
and religious belief.
For most early societies, and for many elements in American society
even today, religion is more a matter of actions than a matter of beliefs.
Things would be easier for the Court if religion only meant beliefs and not
actions, since it is mostly by our actions that we disturb others. The Court
could leave "mere opinions" alone and be confident that its legal restrictions
on behavior would never touch the heart of a "faith." But the Court would
have to ignore the wording of the First Amendment to take this stand, since
it speaks of the "exercise" of religion and its "establishment." That implies
behavior and it would be hard to imagine "establishing" a belief, except
perhaps by compulsory education. Practices are what one can most easily
establish.
Commentators on the First Amendment often assume that it guarantees
freedom of conscience or of belief and not religion in this wider sense. But
hard cases have forced the Court to recognize that religious actions need
protection as much as religious belief." They have been slower to realize
just how diverse this makes us. Usually in speaking of our diversity, we are
thinking of progressive theologians and articulate conscientious objectors.
Would that such understanding were directed to a variety of less intellectualized religious positions. Courts need to consider not only those intellectuals

11. Sanford Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," 25 J.
CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983).
12. LAuRREcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrITONAL LAW 818 n.19 (1978) (emphasis added).
13. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 206 (London 1775).
14. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296. 330 (1940).
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who are being original in their philosophy but also those elements in society
that are not likely to pursue their concerns to the Supreme Court. There are
many in our midst who have inherited subcultures which were already "out
of date" in the time of the Founding Fathers, but which may outlast the
culture of Jefferson's "Enlightenment."
Our courts have been strongly affected by the modernizing ideology
which I traced, accepting a narrow definition of religion which makes it a
matter of one's most philosophical and poetic solitude. But nothing is intrinsically secular. Anything whatsoever can be given religious meaning and
purpose: cooking, planting, war, medicine, commerce, play, and politics. In
an integral culture, these activities are not just governed by religion; they are
the religion itself. They are the very ways in which people make contact with
powers which are beyond the ordinary. This is a challenge for our courts,
which should see that we are all allowed to follow our traditions so far as
this can be reconciled with our living together.
For purposes of my historical study I distilled a definition of religion
from standard anthropological and sociological treatments, to see religion as
that which gives access to supernaturalpowers or to the presence of such
powers. Only after a process of secularization is the area of religion reduced
to little more than beliefs about a "Supreme Being." And that was not the
religious experience of many at the time of the Constitution-native Americans, slaves, and whites of many descriptions. They did not philosophize
about their religion, they practiced it. Or in the words of the Amendment,
they exercised their religion.
II. AMBIGUITIES OF THE FUNCTIONAIJSUBSTANTIVE DISTINCTION
Over the first century of our history, the Supreme Court's understanding
of religion tended to be narrow. In 1890, the Supreme Court told the Mormons that their practice of polygamy was not really a religious tenet, because
it went against "the laws of all civilized and Christian countries," and would
"shock the moral judgment of the community."" To call polygamy "a tenet
of religion is to offend the commonsense of mankind," the Court stated.'"
Religion was what the Court and the country found more or less self-evident,
the consensus of civilization. In our second century, we have become more
sensitive to cultural variety. So in 1965 the Court was looking for a definition that would leave the content or the dogmas of a religion aside, and
would determine what was religious on another basis. Tillich's definition was
offered as a neutral way of deciding whether a belief qualified as truly reli-

15. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
16.

Id. at 342.
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gious. 7 Whatever functioned as one's ultimate or most serious concern was
thereby identified as that which should be protected as an exercise of religion.
Unfortunately, confusion crept into legal thinking at this point. Legal
scholars favored a dichotomy of functional, as opposed to "content-based"
definitions, and assumed that functional definitions were more acceptable
because they were not normative. 8 In other words, identifying what functions as your religion avoids questions of what kind of religion is more acceptable or authentic.
There are two things wrong with this function/content distinction. In the
first place, functional definitions are not sui generis. They make religions
part of a larger category along with whatever else shares the same function.
Second, it turns out that functional definitions can be normative also. We
need to take up each of these points.
A more significant dichotomy than function/content is the difference
between two kinds of substantive definitions. It is true that our laws must
avoid entanglement with the specific content of religions. Apparently, the
Court had assumed that all substantive definitions referred to specific beliefs.
But substantive analytical definitions refer to content only in terms of the
analytical elements common to religions rather than to specific dogmatic
particulars. We are not speaking here of beliefs common to all religions. A
substantive definition might assert that religions always refer to ultimate
reality, without going on to assume that this will involve a "Being" or even
that it will involve morality.
To put it another way, analytical definitions may only reveal what questions religions ask or what subjects they address, and not what answers they
give. To say that religion is concerned with uncanny powers beyond any
human power is an analytical statement, like saying that economics is about
the production and exchange of goods. It does not stipulate which are the
truest ways of thinking about this power. As we shall see, our frequent mention of power is not accidental, and gains authority from the fact that the
very word "religion" comes from the Latin religare, which means to hold
back or bind fast. In its essence, as anthropologists frequently observe, religion deals with taboos-the marking off of places, times, persons, things or
actions as forbidden, invoking dread at their power."
The thing that makes analytical definitions more appropriate than func17. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 189 (1965).
18. E.g., Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U.
L. REV. 163. 166 (1977); Jesse Choper, Defining 'Religion' in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579, 594-601; William G. Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital
Reality, 34 OHIo ST. LJ. 15, 78 passim (1973); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion. 91
HARv. L. ev. 1056, 1072 (1978).
19. WINSTON KINO, INTRODUCTON TO RELIGION: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH 11 (1968).
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tional ones here is that they see things in terms of the elements peculiar to
them-what is unique to religion, in this instance. Definitions should strive
for this precision. By contrast, functional definitions see things in terms of
the wider categories to which they belong. A functional definition of religion
sees it as one way of doing some particular thing, among other ways. In other words, functional definitions do not take religion as seriously, indicating
that it is only one manner of accomplishing a particular task. If one thought
that religion was only one way of bonding society, for example, the Court
might wonder why it needed special protections.
One may assume that the Founders thought of religion as sui generis
with unique characteristics. But when the Supreme Court recently began to
assume that "religious" was just another way of saying "intense," it widened
the concept of religion so greatly as to make it unnecessary.' Wherever one
can make functional substitutions, there is no longer the need to invoke a
freedom of religious exercise. There are other rights which could govern the
case, and indeed many cases involving religion have been resolved more
simply under the rights of free speech or assembly. But if religion is sui
generis we will need a substantive definition.
The other problem with functional definitions is that they can be normative too. Tillich thought that some people had concerns-like their nation or
worldly success-that they put in the position of being ultimate, which were
not truly ultimate and were therefore "idolatrous."'" But idolatry is a form
of religion in most people's lexicons. Justices certainly do not want to decide
which of our ultimate concerns are merely idolatrous, which deserve protection and which we should be encouraged to outgrow. Whether or not the
Justices knew it, Tillich's own test for true ultimacy was in terms of whether
the object was worthy of that concern or commitment.' So his functional
definition ends up being normative.
The Seeger decision also cites Webster's Dictionary,' the defendants's

own claims,u judicial precedent,' the statute-with its political definition
of religion,' records of the legislature's intent," and a law review article. 2 Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, cited the editors of Life magazine2 and various authorities on Hinduism 3" and Buddhism,3 in his ef20. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
21. PAUL TiLhcH, DYNAMICS OF FArrH 12, 27 (1957)
22. Id. at 11-12; see also James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court: Tillich's "Ultimate
Concern" as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 245, 267-72 (1988).
23. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 174.
24. Id
25. Id at 175-76
26. Id at 174.
27. Id at 176-79.
28. Id at 170.
29. Id at 189 (Douglas, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 190 (Douglas. J., concurring).
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fort not to find common ground. The Court was looking for help everywhere,
but not finding enough.
A number of semantic mistakes were also made in the Seeger case which
would be amplified later. The Court noted that the statute in question, the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, declared that "a merely
personal moral code" would not merit a religious exemption.32 But the
Court claimed, by appealing to Tillich's concept, that a moral belief can
"occupy in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God
of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."33 This is not really true.
Purely ethical or moral beliefs do not have a position parallel to the beliefs
of those who claim that their actions are subject to extratemporal consequences. This is not to claim that religious beliefs are more moral than others, just different, but frighteningly different. Others have suggested that this
matter of extratemporal consequences. is the mark of a religious conscience,
of violating that conscience are eternal or infinite in
in that the consequences
4
some sense.
Defendant Seeger claimed that he had "a religious faith in a purely ethical creed" 35 and the Justices took this as his way of expressing an "ultimate
concern."' They went on to declare that they would accept "all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith [sic], to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. '3, Thus they created an analytical and substantive definition of religion to go along with the earlier functional one.
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that Seeger's "religion" did not qualify for conscientious objector
exemption from the draft and he was convicted. 3' The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement
distinguished between beliefs that were "externally compelled" or "internally
derived," and was therefore an "impermissible classification" under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 39 In other words, the Court of Appeals faulted the trial court for making a distinction between two religious
positions.
That, again, was a mistake. Religion is by its nature something that "externally compels." By a phenomenological definition religion always involves

31. Id. at 191 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 173.
33. Id. at 176.
34. Choper, supra note 18, at 597-604.
35. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. Jakobson, a defendant in a companion case characterized his religion as
"attitudes," the violation of which did not seem to involve any consequences to him. Id. at 168.
36. It at 187.
37. Id. at 176.
38. Id. at 166.
39. Id. at 167 (citing United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964)).
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power or "a Power" outside the believer. The Seeger decision itself uses the
term "power" eight times in wrestling with the notion of religion. Rudolf
Otto, in the classic statement of the phenomenological study of religion,
pointed out that the common denominator of humanity's religious sense, not
necessarily involving the notion of a God, is a sense of awe or fear before
the numinous.' The alien character of the power that is the source of this
feeling is, he said, an essential characteristic of all religions.4' In the seventy-five years since his work, students of religion have not disputed that characterization. One's religion is, precisely, that which is not in one's control,
and is no doubt why the Founders felt it should be respected. By contrast, a
"personal moral code," in Congress's phrase,42 is more likely to be internally derived.
Justice Douglas thought that the majority opinion had not been forthright.43 It seems Justice Douglas thought the Court should have invalidated
the statute for specifying a "Supreme Being" and thereby singling out one
type of religion for protection." Justice Douglas was thinking back to
Torcaso v. Watkins45 which had pointed out that not all religions are "theistic." Justice Douglas's colleagues had evaded his objection by claiming
that Congress was already trying to liberalize the notion of religion by using
the phrase "Supreme Being" instead of "God."4' That seemed to justify
them in liberalizing even further, allowing anything that functioned as religion to justify an exemption from military service."
One should pause to note that not only are some religions without gods,
but that not every philosophy that contains the term "God" is a religion. If
there is no traffic between that God and the devotee, there is no reason to
consider it anything more than a philosophy. The point to be stressed is that
it is universally understood that religions must have consequences for the
believer.
III. THE COURT BECOMES CREATrVE AND CONTROVERSIAL
In 1970 the Supreme Court further confused the issue of the essence of
religion in Welsh v. United States,'9 in which the facts were very close to
those of Seeger. Justice Black, writing for a plurality of four which included

40.

RUDOLF OTro. THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 5 passim (John W. Harvey. trans. Oxford 1924).

41. Id. at 31-40.
42. 50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1958).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 193 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 175.

48. Id at 187.
49.

398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion).
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Justice Douglas, was troubled by the issue of religious establishment which
he thought was implied in the exemption from military service provided by
Congress. There were two ways to deal with the issue: nullify the statute as
an unconstitutional establishment, or define religion so widely as to rob it of
any independent meaning. The plurality chose the latter and were accused by
Justice Harlan of "groping to preserve the conscientious objector status at all
cost."'
Welsh had denied that his objection was religious, but the four prevailing
Justices declared that he was not the best judge of that matter." His political and personal moral views, specifically excluded by statute from the exemption, were taken as religious by using a functional criterion. For the
Court's discussion now turned on how strong or deep the belief was. In other
words, for this Court religious meant intense, which is presumably something
more than sincere. As in a functional definition, religion is here seen as a
synonym for a more common characteristic.
One must ask, though, what is an intense belief? Is it not just a belief
held by an intense, stubborn or emotional person? That would make it a
psychological rather than a religious characteristic. "Religion," on this understanding, is not a type of belief but a level of belief. The exemption which
was originally justified only because of religious imperatives is now denied
only to "those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection
to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but
instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.

52

All this contradicted the statute's wording quite directly.53 The original
religious basis for the exemption would have allowed it to someone who did
not really mind the prospect of killing and was only restrained by religious
dogma. But such a person would fail the Court's new test!
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan revealed more of the erosion of
the notion of religion. "Having chosen to exempt," he wrote, the law "cannot
draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand
and secular beliefs on the other."' That would transgress the establishment
prohibition, for the exemption had to be extended to all beliefs of a certain
"intensity of moral conviction." 5 Apparently, Justice Harlan also had fallen
into the habit of thinking that the First Amendment was to preserve belief or
the inviolability of conscience. But the First Amendment protects religion,

50. Id. at 354 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 341.
52. Id. at 342-43.
53. See Justice Harlan's concurrence for an analysis of the extent to which the plurality's opinion
explicitly contradicted the wording of the statute. Jed at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 358 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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not just belief, and the more logical conclusion is that the statutory exemption should be offered to all religions.
Justice Harlan further assumed that the religious exemption was an historical relic from a time when ethics and morals were taught mostly by religious institutions.' He implied that they are now the province mostly of
secular philosophy."' Again, we see the assumption that religion has been
replaced by functional equivalents and is not sui generis.
The exasperation of a minority on that Court was shown in Justice
White's dissent. He and two colleagues pointed out that all the concern over
establishment was misplaced; the issue in the draft law was free exercise."S
Without the religious exemption the law would force the government to
prosecute draftees for their religious inability to comply.59 Seen in that light,
these Justices thought that Congress had done a good job in accommodating
free exercise, while the Court was embarrassing itself by its arbitrary redefinitions.
IV. MEETING CURRENT QUESTIONS

Congress and the Court could easily agree on a substantive and analytical
definition of religion which would echo their earlier ones, while stopping
short of the wayward conclusions of Welsh. The criticisms made in this
article could be answered by combining the formulas that clashed in Seeger
so that religion is defined as: "The protections guaranteed to religion are
offered to those with a sincere belief in, or relation to, a power or being to
which all else is subordinate, but excluding essentially political, social or
philosophical opinions or a moral code involving no transcendent consequences." Or, in the words of some earlier decisions, our laws could guarantee the rights of religion "to those who, by training or belief, bear responsibility to a power or authority higher than any worldly one, which would lead
to the disregard of elementary self-interest."' Such a definition would be
truer to tradition and expectation, and would restore a sense of dignity to
First Amendment interpretation.
If the Court were now to adopt a substantive definition of religion, it
would tend to narrow the protections for free exercise in a few areas. Our
courts have recently used the cover of religion to enlarge a right of privacy.6"' It was the latter motive that makes the careless logic of Welsh seem to

56. Id. at 366 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
57. Id
58. Id. at 371-72 (White, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id
60. This definition is a combination of cases to which Justice Harlan cites. WeLsh, 398 U.S. at 348
(Harlan, J., concurring). These cases include United States v. Macintosh. 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Berman v.
United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946); and United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
61. Choper, supra note 18, at 591.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

be part of the cultural "fire sale" of the 1970s.
Correspondingly, such a definition will also narrow the scope of the
establishment prohibition. This might displease some conservatives who
would like to accuse the government of establishing secularism. Yet, many
traditionalists would be willing to see the public encouragement of a civil
religion, one which provides an essential foundation under the Constitution
itself. Of course, in the area of education, where children have few powers of
resistance or discernment, the courts should remain especially watchful. As
schools become more all-enveloping, there is a need for public recognition of
the important areas not touched by the curriculum. On educational grounds
alone we should have some official avowal of the fact that there are values
which transcend utility and patriotism, and that are no business of mere
schools. To adopt a substantive definition of religion would provide legal
protection to religions that seem idolatrous or superstitious to some. That is
precisely the reason for constitutional guarantees. Ironically, the Court's
effort to broaden the definition of religion in Seeger and Welsh was to earn
wider respect for religion, beyond what the Court thought was due to its
traditional forms.
The recent and controversial decision in Employment Bureau v. Smith'
avoids some of the mistakes made earlier, but raises other problems regarding the concept of religion. The majority opinion clearly acknowledged the
constitution's protection of religious actions as well as beliefs.63 It recognized that any action whatsoever can become religious if the actor gives it a
religious meaning. That was implied when the Court declared that the First
Amendment was meant to prevent states from prohibiting "acts or abstentions
only when they are engaged in for religious reasons,"' for that would unfairly burden believers. But it is unlikely that any legislature will ban an
activity only insofar as it is given a religious meaning. Therefore the Court
has created an empty category, and if it follows this logic it will cease to
exercise any protection of religious exercise.
Under the new guideline, if a law of general applicability is passed
against dunking people under water, a perfectly reasonable law, the Court
will deny religious exemptions and thereby prohibit the Baptist religion. This
may seem absurd, but it is exactly what happened in Smith to a religion that
is older than the Baptist religion, and much older than the U.S. government,
when the Court refused to grant an exemption for the sacramental use of
peyote, a religious practice which predates Columbus.' As we have noted
earlier, any action whatsoever can be given a religious meaning. Under the

62.
63.
64.
65.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 890.
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older Sherbert Rule, reasonable exemptions could be made to acts which
inhibited religious freedom, unless the government's interest was judged to
be compelling.' The new majority claims that the Sherbert Rule was not
being used much anyway.67
One wonders about the reasoning behind such a disdain for precedent.
The new guideline will, of course, narrow the establishment prohibition, and
perhaps that was the goal." On the free exercise side, it will fall hardest on
minority faiths. There will then be an obvious test of both the delicate matter
of centrality/sincerity of beliefs and how long it takes groups to emigrate, as
some Amish communities are doing today because they find Honduras to be
freer than the United States. Legislators, who have depended on the courts to
fine-tune their general laws, will have to reflect on their more exposed position and on the definition of religion which they employ, if the Court proves
uninterested in such questions.
Finally, our considerations of the nature of religion bears on the question
of whether the practice of abortion could ever be ruled to be an exercise of
religious freedom. This possibility gave pause to proponents of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Bill, which was itself a response to the Smith decision.
They feared that a strengthened First Amendment might be used to justify
abortion, if the principles of Roe v. Wade' are weakened.
Again, the notion that the freedom of religious exercise could be used to
permit abortion shows a confusion of the meaning of the term religion. Religions do not permit things; they command them. This is literally part of the
definition of religion. One's religion is the final term in one's thinking, or as
Tillich put it, one's ultimate concern. ° To grant permission to do something
is to indicate that something else will become determinative-some personal
preference. Probably few could plausibly argue that their religion demands
abortion. Instead, they will say that their religion permits abortion, or a specific abortion. However, they would be claiming that their ultimate concern
is giving way to some lesser consideration like health, career, family finances, a less-than-optimal baby, or embarrassment.
Again, Tillich had the main point right: religion has to do with one's
deepest concern, the final cause, or ultimate reality. It does not willingly
stand aside while some other concern takes over. If it did, it would be clear
that one did not take one's religion very seriously. In the terminology of
Welsh, you would have shown that you had more intense beliefs than your

66. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
67. Smith. 494 U.S. at 883.
68. For instance, Justice Scalia, who drove the Court's "bulldozer" (his term) over its free exercise
traditions in Smith 11, showed an unwonted delicacy in its next establishment case, Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
69. 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
70. TH.UCH, supra note 21, at 122.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

religion."'
Of course, the principle enunciated in Smith itself would also prohibit a
freedom-of-religious-exercise protection for abortion. If Roe v. Wade were
overturned, there would be some limits on abortion. So long as there are
generally applicable criminal laws which were not passed for the express
purpose of limiting religious exercise, the present Court is not prepared to
grant a religious exemption for the practice.
V. CONCLUSION

Reversing the mistakes of recent court decision goes against the grain of
our legal tradition, and certainly we expect justices to show caution in doing
so. But there is also room for reflection on whether sufficient caution was
shown in the remarkable changes discussed above, which amount to a constitutional revolution.

71.
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